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Abstract
We construct an open-economy DSGE model with a banking sector to analyse the
impact of the recent credit crunch on a small open economy. In our model the banking
sector operates under monopolistic competition, collects deposits and grants collater-
alized loans. Collateral eﬀects amplify monetary policy actions, interest rate stickiness
dampens the transmission of interest rates, and ﬁnancial shocks generate non-negligible
real and nominal eﬀects. As an application we estimate the model for Poland - a typ-
ical small open economy. According to the results, ﬁnancial shocks had a substantial,
though not overwhelming, impact on the Polish economy during the 2008/09 crisis,
lowering GDP by a little over one percent.
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1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis aﬀected economies worldwide. It originated from problems with subprime
mortgages in the United States, but spread soon to international ﬁnancial markets. Several
ﬁnancial institutions had to be bailed out by governments. Moreover, the disease soon
started to spread to the real economy. Its impact was transmitted i.a. via negative wealth
eﬀects (housing and stock market busts), decreased consumer conﬁdence and the crunch in
credit markets. Moreover, in the case of small open economies decreased demand for exports
and limited access to external funding further contributed to the slowdown1. As a result
the world economy entered its worst recession since World War II. It is not possible, and
probably never will be, to tell precisely how various channels contributed to the weakening
of economic activity in various countries. In particular, it seems unlikely to measure how
much of the slowdown in consumption and investment expenditure was due to widespread
panic - a sort of animal instinct behaviour among households and investors. In this paper
we undertake a more decent exercise: we only assess the role played in transmitting the
slowdown by the banking sector. To do this we construct a general equilibrium model with
a banking sector.
The literature incorporating a ﬁnancial sector into macroeconomic models has been de-
veloping fast over the last two decades. A seminal position is Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
where ﬁnancial frictions have been incorporated into a general equilibrium model. This
approach has been further developed and merged with the New-Keynesian framework by
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996), becoming the workhorse ﬁnancial frictions model in
the 2000's. In this model frictions arise because monitoring the loan applicant is costly - this
generates an external ﬁnance premium and, hence increases the lending rate. This idea has
been extensively used i.a. by Choi and Cook (2004) to analyse the balance sheet channel in
emerging markets or by Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2007) to study business cycle im-
plications of ﬁnancial frictions. Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) provided an endogenous
explanation for steady state diﬀerentials between lending and money market rates. Cúr-
dia and Woodford (2008) derived optimal monetary policy in the presence of time-varying
interest rate spreads in a model with heterogeneous agents.
A second important direction was introduced by Iacoviello (2005), who concentrated on
quantities rather than on prices of loans. In his model households accumulate housing wealth,
which can be used as loan collateral. Collateral constraints capture the eﬀects of quantitative
restrictions generated by the banking sector. An important application is Gerali, Neri, Sessa,
and Signoretti (2009) where a model with collateral constraints and monopolistic competition
in the banking sector was used to analyse i.a. the impact of ﬁnancial frictions on monetary
transmission and a credit crunch scenario. The eruption of the ﬁnancial crisis contributed
1For a thorough analysis of the crisis see e.g BIS (2009).
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to even more interest in these models and probably we will see several new studies in this
ﬁeld soon.
Our model is written in the spirit of Iacoviello (2005) and Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Sig-
noretti (2009). Apart from ﬁnancial sector issues it has the standard features of new Keyne-
sian models (e.g. Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003) including
monopolistically competitive markets and nominal rigidities in goods and labour markets.
We contribute to the existing ﬁnancial frictions literature by incorporating the model into a
small open economy framework (e.g. Galí and Monacelli (2005), Altig, Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Lindé, 2005, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005, Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé,
and Villani, 2005). This seems important, since contemporaneous economies can rarely be
treated as closed. Our economy is populated by patient (saving) and impatient (borrowing)
households as well as (borrowing) entrepreneurs. Consumers consume and accumulate hous-
ing. Entrepreneurs produce homogeneous goods that are diﬀerentiated by monopolistically
competitive retailers and merged with foreign goods before they are used for consumption
or investment. Monopolistically competitive banks collect deposits, grant loans and have
access to domestic and international money markets. In terms of ﬁnancial frictions both,
collateral constraints (on housing or capital) and interest rate spreads play a role and are
able to generate non-negligible real and nominal eﬀects.
As an application we estimate the model using data for Poland - a typical small open
economy. This country has been substantially (though probably somewhat less than most EU
countries) aﬀected by the crisis. GDP growth is expected to decrease from 5.0% in 2008 to
0.4% in 2009 and exports are expected to contract by almost 8% in 2009 (2009 data from NBP
(2009a) projection) (Figure 1). The slowdown was deepened by the restrictive behaviour of
Polish banks, who signiﬁcantly increased the cost of borrowing and additionally tightened
lending conditions. It should be noted that, similarly to several other small open economies,
the behaviour of Polish banks was driven by external rather than internal factors. Polish
banks have not invested funds in toxic assets, subprime lending was not excessive and the
housing market did not crash. Nevertheless the international crisis of conﬁdence transmitted
to the Polish interbank market, reducing the volume of transactions and raising spreads. This
transmitted to spreads on commercial loans and deposits. Moreover, survey evidence shows
that banks drastically tightened lending standards raising i.a. collateral requirements (NBP,
2009b). As a result lending to households and enterprises broke down. Between 1q2008 and
2q2009 new loans to households decreased by a quarter and to enterprises by a third (Figure
2). Simulations based on our model show that shocks generated by the Polish banking sector
in late 2008 and early 2009 indeed deepened the economic slowdown. In particular shocks
to spreads and LTV ratios contributed 1.3 per cent to the slowdown of GDP.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section two presents the model, sec-
tion three the calibrating/ estimating procedure and section four the results. Section ﬁve
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concludes.
2 The model
We model a heterogeneous agents small open economy with ﬁnancial frictions. Our economy
is populated by patient households, impatient households and entrepreneurs. Patient house-
holds consume, accumulate housing stock, save, and work. Impatient households consume,
accumulate housing stock, borrow and work. Entrepreneurs produce homogeneous interme-
diate goods using capital purchased form capital good producers and labour supplied by
households. Furthermore, entrepreneurs can borrow to ﬁnance capital purchases.
Both patient and impatient households supply their diﬀerentiated labour services through
labour unions which set their wages to maximise the members' utility. Labour is sold to a
competitive intermediary who supplies undiﬀerentiated labour services to entrepreneurs.
There are three stages of production. First, entrepreneurs produce homogeneous interme-
diate goods which are sold in perfectly competitive markets to retailers. Next, retailers brand
them at no cost and sell diﬀerentiated intermediate goods in monopolistically competitive
markets to aggregators. Finally, aggregators aggregate domestic intermediate diﬀerentiated
goods and foreign diﬀerentiated goods into one ﬁnal domestic good.
There are also capital good and housing producers. Those producers use ﬁnal consump-
tion goods to produce capital or housing with a technology that is subject to an investment
adjustment cost. The adjustment cost allows for price of capital and housing to diﬀer from
the price of consumption goods.
In the ﬁnancial sector there are lending and saving banks as well as lending and saving
ﬁnancial intermediaries. A saving ﬁnancial intermediary purchases diﬀerentiated deposits
from saving banks and sells undiﬀerentiated deposits to households (a convenient way is to
think of a deposit or a loan as a product). Similarly, the lending ﬁnancial intermediary pur-
chases diﬀerentiated loans from lending banks and sells undiﬀerentiated loans to households
or ﬁrms. In order to produce a deposit or a loan banks need to purchase a deposit or a loan
at the interbank market at the interbank interest rate. There is also a central bank that
controls the interbank interest rate using open market operations and keeps it at the level
set according to a standard Taylor rule.
There are two types of frictions in the ﬁnancial sector. First the interest rates on loans,
savings and the interbank interest rate are diﬀerent. The diﬀerence is due to technological
reasons and is subject to external shocks. This is a convenient modelling device that allows
to capture changes in interest rate spreads which took place during the recent credit crunch.
Second, borrowers need collateral to take a loan either in the form of housing or capital.
The restrictiveness of this constraint is perturbed stochastically in the form of shock to the
required LTV ratios. Again, this is a convenient modelling device that allows to introduce
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into a DSGE model the recent change in loan granting policies in commercial banks. It
should be noted that both types of ﬁnancial disturbances enter our model exogeneously.
This reﬂects the fact that ﬁnancial shocks that aﬀected Poland (as well as several other
small open economies) were primarily driven by external developments.
2.1 Households and entrepreneurs.
The economy is populated by impatient households, patient households, and entrepreneurs
of measure γI , γP , and γE, respectively (the measure of all agents in the economy is one
γI + γP + γE = 1). The important diﬀerence between agents is the value of their discount
factors. The discount factor of patient households βP is higher than the discount factors
of impatient households βI . For simplicity we assume that entrepreneurs have the same
discount factor as impatient households βE = βI .
2.1.1 Patient households.
The patient household ι chooses consumption cPt , the stock of housing χ
P
t and deposits D
H
t .
The decision on the labour supply nPt is not made by the household but by a labour union,
details of this decision are described later. The expected lifetime utility of a representative
household is as follows
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtP εu,t
[(
cPt (ι)− ξcPt−1
)1−σc
1− σc + εχ,t
χPt (ι)
1−σχ
1− σχ − εn,t
nPt (ι)
1+σn
1 + σn
]
(1)
where ξ denotes the degree of external habit formation and εu,t, εχ,t, εn,t are, respectively,
intertermporal, housing and labour preference shocks. These shocks have an AR(1) repre-
sentation with i.i.d. normal innovations2.
The patient household uses labour income Wtn
P
t , dividends
3 ΠPt and its deposits from
the previous period Dt−1 multiplied by the interest rate on household deposits RHD,t−1 to
ﬁnance its consumption and housing expenditure, new deposits and lump sum taxes4 Tt.
The patient household faces the following budget constraint5
Ptc
P
t (ι) + Pχ,t
(
χPt (ι)− (1− δχ)χPt−1 (ι)
)
+DHt (ι) ≤ WtnPt (ι)
+RHD,t−1D
H
t−1 (ι)− T (ι) + ΠPt (2)
2The autoregressive coeﬃcients are ρu, ρχ, and ρn while the standard deviations are σu, σχ, and σn,
respectively.
3Patient households own all the ﬁrms in this economy.
4Lump sum taxes for convenience are paid only by patient households, since only for patient households
Ricardian equivalence holds.
5The model is calibrated so that in the steady state and its neighbourhood patient households do not
borrow, thus borrowing is excluded from the budget constraint.
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where Pt and Pχ,t denote, respectively, the price of consumption good and the price of
housing, δχ is the depreciation rate of the housing stock and T (ι) denotes taxes.
2.1.2 Impatient households.
Impatient households diﬀerently from patient households are borrowers not lenders in the
neighbourhood of the steady state. A representative impatient household chooses consump-
tion cIt , the stock of housing χ
I and loans LHt . Similarly as for patient households, labour
supply decision is taken by a labour union. Impatient households maximise the following
expected utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtIεu,t
[(
cIt (ι)− ξcIt−1
)1−σc
1− σc + εχ,t
χIt (ι)
1−σχ
1− σχ − εn,t
nIt (ι)
1+σn
1 + σn
]
(3)
Impatient households spending on consumption, accumulation of housing and debt pay-
ment RHL,t−1L
H
t−1 is ﬁnanced by labour income Wtn
I
t , and new borrowing
6. The budget
constraint of the impatient household is
Ptc
I
t (ι) + Pχ,t
(
χIt (ι)− (1− δχ)χIt−1 (ι)
)
+RHL,t−1L
H
t−1 (ι) ≤ WtnIt (ι) + LHt (ι)− Tt (ι) (4)
Furthermore impatient households face the following borrowing constraint
RHL,tL
H
t (ι) ≤ mHt Et
[
Pχ,t+1 (1− δχ)χIt (ι)
]
(5)
wheremHt is households loan-to-value ratio which follows an AR(1) process with i.i.d. normal
innovations7.
2.1.3 Entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs draw utility only from their consumption cEt , their utility function has the
following form
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βE)
t
(
εu,t
(
cEt (ι)− ξcEt−1
)1−σc
1− σc
)
(6)
In order to ﬁnance consumption they run ﬁrms producing homogeneous intermediate goods
yW,t with the following technology
yW,t (ι) = At [ut (ι) kt−1 (ι)]
α nt (ι)
1−α (7)
6Note that impatient households do not own any ﬁrms thus they do not receive any dividends.
7The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρmH and the standard deviation is σmH .
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where At is an exogenous AR(1) process for the total factor productivity
8, ut ∈ [0,∞) is
the capital utilisation rate9, kt is the capital stock and nt is the labour input. The capital
utilisation rate can be changed but only at a cost ψ (ut) kt−1 which is expressed in terms of
consumption units and the function ψ (u) satisﬁes ψ (1) = 0, ψ′ (1) > 0 and ψ′′ (1) > 0 (we
assume no capital utilisation adjustment cost in the deterministic steady state). In order
to ﬁnance their expenditure on consumption, labour services, capital accumulation, capital
utilisation rate adjustment cost and repayment of debt RFL,t−1L
F
t−1 they use the revenue from
their output sales and new loans LFt
Ptc
E
t (ι) +Wtnt (ι) + Pk,t (kt (ι)− (1− δk) kt−1 (ι)) + Ptψ (ut (ι)) kt−1 (ι)
+RFL,t−1L
F
t−1 (ι) = PW,tyW,t (ι) + L
F
t (ι)− Tt (ι) (8)
where Pk,t is the price of capital, PW,t is the price of the homogeneous intermediate good and
δk is the depreciation rate of physical capital.
In a ﬁnancial market entrepreneurs face the following borrowing constraint
RFL,tL
F
t (ι) ≤ mFt Et [Pk,t+1 (1− δk) kt (ι)] (9)
where mFt is ﬁrm's loan-to-value ratio which follows an AR(1) process with i.i.d. normal
innovations10.
2.1.4 Labour supply.
We assume that each household has a continuum of labour types of measure one, h ∈ [0, 1].
Moreover, for each type h there is a labour union that sets the wage for its labour typeWt (h)
and each household belongs to all of the labour unions (i.e. each union includes γP patients
and γI impatiens). Labour services are sold to perfectly competitive aggregators who pool
all the labour types into one undiﬀerentiated labour service with the following function
nt =
((
γI + γP
) ∫ 1
0
nt (h)
1
1+µw dh
)1+µw
(10)
The problem of the aggregator gives the following demand for labour of type h
nt(h) =
1
γI + γP
[
Wt (h)
Wt
]−(1+µw)
µw
nt (11)
8The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρA and the standard deviation is σA.
9ut is normalised, so that the deterministic steady state capacity utilisation rate is equal to one.
10The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρmF and the standard deviation is σmF .
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where
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
Wt(h)
−1
µw dh
)−µw
(12)
is the aggregate wage in the economy.
The union's discount factor is the weighted average of those of its members β = γP/
(
γP + γI
)
βP+
γI/
(
γP + γI
)
βI . The union sets the wage rate according the the standard Calvo scheme,
i.e. with probability (1− θw) it receives a signal to reoptimise and then sets its wage to
maximise the utility of its average member subject to the demand for its labour services
and with probability θw does not receive the signal and indexes its wage according to the
following rule
Wt+1 (h) = ((1− ζw) p¯i + ζwpit−1)Wt (h) (13)
where p¯i is the steady state inﬂation rate and ζw ∈ [0, 1].
2.2 Producers
There are three sectors in the economy: capital goods sector, housing sector and consumption
goods sector. In the capital goods sector and the housing sector we have, respectively, capital
goods producers and housing producers which operate in perfectly competitive markets. In
the consumption goods sector we have the entrepreneurs described earlier, who sell their
undiﬀerentiated goods to retailers who brand those goods, thus diﬀerentiating them, and
sell them to aggregators at home and abroad. Aggregators combine diﬀerentiated domestic
intermediate goods and diﬀerentiated foreign intermediate goods into a single ﬁnal good.
2.2.1 Capital Good Producers
Capital good producers operate in a perfectly competitive market and use ﬁnal consumption
goods to produce capital goods. In each period a capital good producer buys ik,t of ﬁnal
consumption goods and old undepreciated capital (1− δk) kt−1 from entrepreneurs. Next she
transforms old undepreciated capital one-to-one into new capital, while the transformation
of the ﬁnal goods is subject to adjustment cost Sk (ik,t/ik,t−1). We adopt the speciﬁcation of
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and assume that in the deterministic steady state
there are no capital adjustment costs (Sk (1) = S
′
k (1) = 0), and the function is concave in
the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady state (S
′′
k (1) =
1
κk
> 0). Thus the technology
to produce new capital is given by
kt = (1− δ) kt−1 +
(
1− Sk
(
ik,t
ik,t−1
))
ik,t (14)
The new capital is then sold to entrepreneurs and can be used in the next period production
process. The real price of capital is denoted as pk,t = Pk,t/Pt.
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2.2.2 Housing Producers
Housing producers act in a similar fashion as the capital good producers. The stock of new
housing follows
χt = (1− δχ)χt−1 + Sχ
(
iχ,t
iχ,t−1
)
iχ,t (15)
where the function describing adjustment cost Sχ (iχ,t/iχ,t−1) satisﬁes Sχ (1) = S
′
χ (1) = 0
and S ′′χ (1) =
1
κχ
> 0. The real price of capital is denoted as pχ,t = Pχ,t/Pt.
2.2.3 Final Good Producers
Final good producers play the role of aggregators. They buy diﬀerentiated product from
domestic retailers yH,t (jH) and importing retailers yF,t (jF ) and aggregate them into a single
ﬁnal good, which they sell in a perfectly competitive market. The ﬁnal good is produced
according to the following technology
yt =
[
η
µ
1+µy
1
1+µ
H,t + (1− η)
µ
1+µ y
1
1+µ
F,t
]1+µ
(16)
where
yH,t =
(∫ 1
0
yH,t (jH)
1
1+µH djH
)1+µH
(17)
yF,t =
(∫ 1
0
yF,t (jF )
1
1+µF djF
)1+µF
(18)
and η is the home bias parameter. The problem of the aggregator gives the following demands
for diﬀerentiated goods
yH,t(jH) =
(
PH,t (jH)
PH,t
)−(1+µH)
µH
yH,t (19)
yF,t(jF ) =
(
PF,t (jF )
PF,t
)−(1+µF )
µF
yF,t (20)
where
yF,t = (1− η)
(
PF,t
Pt
)−(1+µ)
µ
yt (21)
yH,t = η
(
PH,t
Pt
)−(1+µ)
µ
yt (22)
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and the price aggregates are
PH,t =
[∫
PH,t (jH)
−1
µH djH
]−µH
(23)
PF,t =
[∫
PF,t (jF )
−1
µF djF
]−µF
(24)
2.2.4 Domestic Retailers
There is a continuum of domestic retailers of measure one denoted by jH . They purchase
undiﬀerentiated intermediate goods from entrepreneurs, brand them, thus transforming them
into diﬀerentiated goods, and sell them to aggregators. They act in a monopolistically
competitive environment and set their prices according to the standard Calvo scheme. In
each period each domestic retailer receives with probability (1− θH) a signal to reoptimise
and then sets her price to maximise the expected proﬁts or does not receive the signal and
then indexes her price according to the following rule
PH,t+1 (jH) = PH,t (jH) ((1− ζH) p¯i + ζHpit−1) (25)
where ξF ∈ [0, 1].
2.2.5 Importing Retailers
Again there is a continuum of importing retailers of measure one denoted by jF . Similarly
as the domestic retailers, they purchase undiﬀerentiated goods abroad and brand them, thus
transforming them into diﬀerentiated goods, and sell them to aggregators. They operate in
a monopolistically competitive environment and set their prices according to the standard
Calvo scheme. We assume that prices are sticky in domestic currency, which is consistent
with incomplete pass through. Prices are reoptimised with probability (1− θF ) and with
probability θF prices are indexed according to the following rule
PF,t+1 (jF ) = PF,t (jF ) ((1− ζF ) p¯i + ζFpit−1) (26)
where ξF ∈ [0, 1].
2.2.6 Exporting Retailers
There is a continuum of exporting retailers of measure one, denoted by j∗H . Retailers purchase
domestic undiﬀerentiated goods, brand them and sell them abroad for a price P ∗H,t (j
∗
H), which
is expressed in terms of foreign currency. We assume that prices are sticky in the foreign
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currency. The demand for exported goods is given by
y∗H,t(j
∗
H) =
(
P ∗H,t (j
∗
H)
P ∗H,t
)−(1+µH∗ )
µH∗
y∗H,t (27)
where y∗H (j
∗
H) denotes the output of the retailer j
∗
H , y
∗
H,t is deﬁned as
y∗H,t =
(∫ 1
0
y∗H,t (j
∗
H)
1
1+µ∗
H dj∗H
)1+µ∗H
(28)
and P ∗H,t as
P ∗H,t =
[∫ 1
0
P ∗H,t (j
∗
H)
−1
µH∗ dj∗H
]−µ∗H
(29)
Moreover, we assume that the demand abroad is given by
y∗H,t = (1− η∗)
(
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
)−(1+µ∗H)
µ∗
H
y∗t (30)
Additionally, we assume that foreign demand, the interest rate and inﬂation follow AR(1)
with normal, serially uncorrelated innovations11.
Exporting retailers reoptimise their prices with probability (1− θ∗H) or index them ac-
cording to the following formula
P ∗H,t+1 (j
∗
H) = P
∗
H,t (j
∗
H)
(
(1− ζ∗H) p¯i∗ + ζ∗Hpi∗t−1
)
(31)
with probability θ∗H , where ξ
∗
H ∈ [0, 1].
2.3 The ﬁnancial Sector
Similarly as in the case of the goods producers, banking activity is divided into several steps.
First, saving banks purchase deposit accounts (deposit account is a product, which is sold
and bought) in the interbank market, next they brand them and sell to a ﬁnancial saving
intermediary. The ﬁnancial saving intermediary purchases diﬀerentiated saving accounts ag-
gregates them and sells them as an undiﬀerentiated saving account to households. Similarly,
credit banks take undiﬀerentiated loans in the interbank market, brand them and sell them
to a ﬁnancial lending intermediary. The ﬁnancial lending intermediary aggregates all diﬀer-
entiated loans into a single loan that is oﬀered to either houesholds or ﬁrms. In the loan
production there is specialisation and we have two parallel branches one that produces loans
11The autoregressive coeﬃcients are ρpi∗ , ρy∗ , and ρR∗ while the standard deviations are σpi∗ , σy∗ , and
σR∗ , respectively. We allow for contemporaneous correlation between shocks.
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for households an the other for ﬁrms (entrepreneurs).
In our model ﬁnancial sector disturbances are completely exogenous. We believe that this
way of introducing them into the model is justiﬁed from the point of view of our question. We
are not investigating the potential sources of the recent credit crunch, but merely check the
importance of ﬁnancial sector disturbances to the recent credit crunch in Poland. As it was
argued in the introduction, the crunch in Poland was driven by external developments and
Polish ﬁnancial institutions were in good shape on the onset of the crisis. Given these factors,
we believe that modelling ﬁnancial sector disturbances as exogenous shocks is justiﬁed.
2.3.1 Financial intermediaries
The ﬁnancial savings intermediary collects deposits from households and deposits them in
saving banks. In order to understand the problem of the intermediary it is convenient to think
about the deposit as a product with a price 1/RD, where RD is the interest rate on a given
deposit. Thus the intermediary purchases diﬀerentiated deposits DHt
(
iHD
)
with the interest
rate RHD,t
(
iHD
)
from all saving banks of measure one denoted as iHD , and aggregates them into
one undiﬀerentiated deposit DHt with the interest rate R
H
D,t which is sold to households. The
technology for aggregation is
DHt =
[∫ 1
0
DHt
(
iHD
) 1
1+µD diHD
]1+µD
(32)
Saving intermediaries operate in a competitive environment and take the interest rates as
given and maximise proﬁts given by the formula
1
RHD,t
DHt −
∫ 1
0
1
RiD,t (i
H
D)
DHt
(
iHD
)
diHD (33)
subject to (32).
There are two types of lending intermediaries, one that oﬀers loans to households and
one that oﬀers loans to ﬁrms (entrepreneurs). There is one important diﬀerence between
the lending and saving intermediaries: for the lending intermediary the price of credit is the
interest rate, not its inverse as in case of the saving intermediary. Next, we describe the
behaviour of the lending intermediary for households. Since, the behaviour of the lending
intermediary for ﬁrms is identical, one needs just to replace superscript H with F . Inter-
mediaries for households oﬀer loans LHt to households at the interest rate R
H
L,t which are
ﬁnanced by loans from lending banks LHt
(
iHL
)
of measure one denoted as iHL at the interest
rate RHt
(
iHL
)
. The technology for aggregation is
LHt =
[∫ 1
0
LHt
(
iHL
) 1
1+µH
L diHL
]1+µHL
(34)
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Lending intermediaries operate in a competitive market thus they take the interest rates as
given and maximise proﬁts given by
RHL,tL
H
t −
∫ 1
0
RHL,t
(
iHL
)
LHt
(
iHL
)
diHL (35)
subject to (34).
Solving the problems above we get the demand for the banks' products (deposits or loans)
DHt (i
H
D) =
(
RHD,t
(
iHD
)
RHD,t
)(1+µHD)
µH
D
DHt , (36)
LHt (i
H
L ) =
(
RHL,t
(
iHL
)
RHL,t
)−(1+µHL )
µH
L
LHt , (37)
LFt (i
F
L) =
(
RFL,t
(
iFL
)
RFL,t
)−(1+µFL)
µF
L
LFt , (38)
and from the zero proﬁt condition we get the interest rates
RHD,t =
(∫ 1
0
RHD,t
(
iHD
) 1
µH
D diHD
)µHD
, (39)
RHL,t =
(∫ 1
0
RHL,t
(
iHL
)− 1
µH
L diHL
)−µHL
, (40)
RFL,t =
(∫ 1
0
RFL,t
(
iFL
)− 1
µF
L diFL
)−µFL
. (41)
2.3.2 Saving banks
The saving bank iHD collects deposits from saving intermediaries D
H
t
(
iHD
)
at the interest rate
RHD,t
(
iHD
)
and deposits them in the interbank market DHIB,t
(
iHD
)
at the policy rate Rt. In
order to introduce time varying spreads we assume that for each unit of deposits collected
the bank can deposit at the interbank market zHD,t units of deposit, where z
H
D,t follows an
AR (1) process with mean one and i.i.d. normal innovations12. Thus
DHIB,t
(
iHD
)
= zHD,tD
D
t
(
iHD
)
(42)
The bank operates in a monopolistically competitive environment with the demand function
given by (36). We assume that the bank sets its interest rates according to the Calvo scheme,
12The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρzHD and the standard deviation is σzDH .
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i.e. with probability (1− θD) it receives a signal and reoptimises its interest rate and with
probability θD it does not change the interest rate. Once the the bank receives the signal to
reoptimise it sets its interest rate in order to maximise proﬁts
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βP θ
s
s+1
D
)s+1
ΛPt,t+s+1
[
Rt+sD
H
IB,t+s
(
iHD
)−RH,newD,t (iHD)DHt+s (iHD)] (43)
subject to the deposits demand (36) and (42). Note that (βP )
s+1 ΛPt,t+s+1 is the discount
factor taken from the problem of patient households (who own the bank) between period t
and t + s + 1. Moreover, we put the ” + 1” term because the payments on the deposits are
made one period after the deposit is collected.
2.3.3 Lending banks
There are two types of lending banks both of measure one, one that lends to households iHL
and one that lends to ﬁrms iFL . Here we describe the problem of the former, the problem
of the latter is identical (it is enough to replace the superscript H with F in the formulas).
The lending bank iHL takes loans in the interbank market L
H
IB,t
(
iHL
)
at the policy rate Rt,
and uses those resources to make loans to lending intermediaries LHt
(
iHL
)
at the interest rate
RHL,t
(
iHL
)
. In order to introduce time varying spreads, again we assume that for each unit of
credit taken in the interbank market zHL,t units of loans can be made, where z
H
D,t follows an
AR (1) process with mean one and i.i.d. normal innovations13. Thus
LHt
(
iHL
)
= zHL,tL
H
IB,t
(
iHL
)
(44)
The bank operates in a monopolistically competitive market with the demand function given
by (37). Moreover, we assume that the interest rates are set according to the Calvo scheme.
Thus, the bank receives a signal to reoptimise its interest rate with probability (1− θL). If
the bank receives a signal it sets its interest rate in order to maximise proﬁts
Et
∞∑
s=0
(
βP θ
s
s+1
L
)s+1
ΛPt,t+s+1
[
RH,newL,t
(
iHL
)
LHt+s
(
iHL
)−Rt+sLHIB,t+s (iHL )] (45)
subject to the deposits demand (37) and (44), otherwise it does not change its interest rate.
Again the bank is owned by patient households thus the discount (βP )
s+1 ΛPt,t+s+1 is taken
from the patient household's problem.
Note that since the interbank interest rate is set by the central bank according to a
Taylor rule (as described in section 2.5) the interbank market is cleared by the central bank
through open market operations. Thus there is no market clearing condition in this market
13The autoregressive coeﬃcient is ρzHL and the standard deviation is σzDL .
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(it is replaced by a Taylor rule).
Since our economy is open banks have also access to the foreign interbank market subject
to a a risk premium ρt that is a function of the foreign debt to GDP ratio (as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe, 2003)
ρt = exp
(
−%etL
∗
t
Pty˜t
)
ερ,t (46)
where et denotes the nominal exchange rate, L
∗
t foreign debt, y˜t GDP and ερ,t are i.i.d.
normal innovations (the standard deviation is σρ). This gives rise to the standard uncovered
interest parity condition (UIP) which in loglinearised version is presented in equation (A.34).
2.4 The government
The government uses lump sum taxes to ﬁnance government expenditure. The government's
budget constraint in this economy is given by
Gt = Tt. (47)
Since in our framework Ricardian equivalence holds there is no need to introduce govern-
ment debt. Moreover, we assume that government expenditures are driven by a simple
autoregressive process
Gt = ρgµg + (1− ρg)Gt−1 + εg,t. (48)
with i.i.d. normal innovations (the standard deviation is σg).
2.5 The central Bank
As it is common in the new Keynesian literature, we assume that monetary policy is con-
ducted according to a Taylor rule that targets deviations from the deterministic steady state
inﬂation and GDP, allowing additionally for interest rate smoothing
Rt =
(
Rt−1
R¯
)γR ((pit
p¯i
)γpi ( y˜t
¯˜y
)γy)1−γR
eϕt (49)
where pit =
Pt
Pt−1
, and ϕt are i.i.d. normal innovations (the standard deviation is σR). It's
worth noting that the Taylor rule plays a key role in bringing stability to the model and
determining the reaction of the model economy to exogenous shocks14.
14For discussion see Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005).
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2.6 Market Clearing, Balance of Payments and GDP.
To close the model we need the market clearing conditions for the ﬁnal and intermediate
goods markets and the housing market as well as the balance of payments and the GDP
equations. In the ﬁnal goods market we have
ct + ik,t + iχ,t + gt + ψ (ut) kt−1 = yt (50)
where
ct = γ
IcIt + γ
P cPt + γ
EcEt (51)
Next, the market clearing condition in the intermediate homogeneous goods market is∫ 1
0
yH,t(j)dj +
∫ 1
0
y∗H,t(j)dj = yW,t (52)
Finally, the market clearing condition in the housing market is given by
γPχPt + γ
IχIt = χt−1 (53)
The balance of payments (in home currency) has the following form
∫ 1
0
(1 + τF )PF,t (jF ) yF,t(jF )djF + etR
∗
t−1ρt−1L
∗
t−1
=
∫ 1
0
(1 + τ ∗H)EtP
∗
H,t (j
∗
H) y
∗
H,t(j
∗
H)dj
∗
H + etL
∗
t (54)
GDP is deﬁned as follows
Pty˜t = Ptyt +
∫ 1
0
etP
∗
H,t(j
∗
H)y
∗
H,t(j
∗
H)dj
∗
H −
∫ 1
0
PF,t(jF )yF,t(jF )djF (55)
where y˜ denotes GDP.
3 Calibration and estimation
3.1 Calibration Procedure
Conforming to the practice of bringing DSGE models to the data (Smets and Wouters,
2003; Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani, 2005)) we partly calibrate and partly estimate
the parameters. The calibrated parameters are mainly steady state ratios, that can be
relatively easily found in the data and parameters that have been well established in the
literature and which have previously been found to be weakly identiﬁed in the data. Where
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it applies, parameters are presented as quarterly numbers.
We calibrate the rate of time preference for patient consumers to βP = 0.995 to match
the annual real rate on deposits of 2%. The rate of time preference for impatient consumers
and entrepreneurs is set to βI = βE = 0.975 to make sure that the lending constraint
is binding in the steady state. Depreciation rates of capital and housing are set to δk =
0.025 and δχ = 0.0125 respectively. The steady state loan to value ratios are calibrated
to the long-term averages coming respectively from bank surveys (household LTV) and
corporate reports (enterprise LTV), so that m¯H = 0.7 and m¯F = 0.2. The inﬂation targets
of the NBP and ECB have been set to 0.00625 and 0.005 implying annual inﬂation rates
of 2.5% and 2% respectively. The elasticity of production with respect to capital is set to
α = 0.3, consistent with most of the DSGE literature. Further, as in Gerali, Neri, Sessa,
and Signoretti (2009) we assume equal measures γP , γI and γE for patient and impatient
households and entrepreneurs. The parameter µ is set to 1, so that the Armington elasticity of
substitution between domestic and foreign goods equals 1+µ
µ
= 2 (Ruhl, 2005), and the home
bias parameter is set to η = 0.45 consistent with the export to absorption ratio in Poland in
the recent years. The parameter µw in the labour aggregator was set to 0.1 implying a steady
state markup over wages of 10%. The steady state loan to GDP ratios are set to l¯
H
¯˜y
= .05
and l¯
F
¯˜y
= .06, reﬂecting the GDP ratio of new household and enterprise loans granted during
a quarter. It should be noted that this is much less than the stock of outstanding loans, but
in our view this reﬂects better the notion of ﬂow of credit embedded in the model. Due to the
disinﬂation process in Poland steady state interest rate levels are set according to average
values in the period of stable inﬂation. The steady state export, import, consumption,
investment, housing investment and foreign debt to GDP ratios were calibrated for Poland
consistent with long-term averages. The remaining calibrated parameters are derived from
from steady state relationships. The most important calibrated parameters and the steady
state ratios have been collected in Tables 1 and 2.
3.2 Data and estimation
We ﬁt the model to the data using fourteen macroeconomic time series. These cover the
period 1q1997-2q2009 giving T = 50 quarterly observations. Eleven time series cover the
Polish economy, these are real GDP, real private consumption, real government expenditure,
real investment, consumer price inﬂation (HICP), money market interest rate (WIBOR3M),
spreads between the money market rate and household deposit, household credit and enter-
prise credit interest rates and real new loans to households and enterprises. Three time series
cover the euro area: real GDP, HICP inﬂation and the money market rate (EURIBOR3M).
National account variables have been taken in logs, seasonally adjusted and detrended using
the HP ﬁlter. Inﬂation rates were seasonally adjusted. Due to the disinﬂation process Polish
data on inﬂation and the interest rate were also detrended. All data comes from the Eurostat
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database, except for loans which come from the NBP.
The model has been estimated using Bayesian estimators. Such approach allows for
providing additional information via prior distributions, something important and common
in DSGE model estimation. Choosing parameters of the prior distribution we relied on
the existing DSGE literature, in particular its applications for Poland (Smets and Wouters,
2003; Kolasa, 2008; Gradzewicz and Makarski, 2008). We assumed that the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution for housing is probably higher than for consumption and set their
prior mean values to 4 and 2 respectively. Prior means of all Calvo probability parameters
were set to 0.6, of indexation rates to 0.5 and of autocorrelation of shocks to 0.7 (government
consumption shock is an exception, since its d.g.p. has been deﬁned diﬀerently). Prior means
for the monetary policy rule were set at standard (Taylor, 1993) values. Priors for standard
deviations were mainly set to 0.1 as is common in the literature. In three cases the prior
distributions had to be tightened, since the posterior estimates diverged substantially from
our prior knowledge. First, the estimate of φy was consistently close to zero, which in
our view reﬂected the fact that our sample contained a long period of disinﬂation where
the central bank payed relatively less attention to output performance than under current
inﬂation targeting policy. Second, the estimates of ρmH and ρmF were estimated above 0.9,
which was inconsistent with the data from Senior Loan Oﬃcer Surveys.
Regarding shock processes, the prior means of standard deviations for euro area shocks as
well as domestic policy shocks and shocks to interest rate spreads were set to 0.01. The prior
standard deviations of several other domestic shocks were set to higher values reﬂecting the
ﬁndings in Kolasa (2008), where the substantially higher variance of the Polish economy is
attributed to stronger shocks. Finally, we allowed for the euro area shocks to be correlated,
reﬂecting their non-structural nature. The mean of the correlation coeﬃcients has been
agnostically set to zero.
The estimation was performed as follows. First, the modes of the posterior distributions
have been found using Cris Sim's csminwel procedure. Next we applied the Metropolis-
Hastings algorithm with ﬁve blocks each of 200.000 replications to approximate the complete
posterior distribution. Since the average acceptance rates amounted to 24-26% and diagnos-
tic tests of Brooks and Gelman (1998) conﬁrmed convergence of the Markov chains, we used
the second half of the draws to calculate posterior distributions. These, together with the
assumptions about the priors have been collected in Tables 3 and 4.
We ﬁnd relatively high persistence of shocks with autocorrelation coeﬃcients ranging
from 0.5 to 0.9. This is in line with both international and Polish ﬁndings (e.g. Smets and
Wouters, 2003, Grabek, Kªos, and Utzig-Lenarczyk, 2007). Regarding nominal rigidities we
ﬁnd relatively more price than wage stickiness, and very low indexation parameters. The
estimated stickiness in retail interest rates is non-negligible and is similar for loans and
deposits. The mean value of the Calvo parameter of 0.5 implies an average period of 2
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quarters between interest rate adjustments. This is lower than for wages and prices and is
probably related to the fact that many interest rates are automatically indexed to the money
market rate in Poland. From the Taylor rule only the coeﬃcient of inertia is clearly identiﬁed
in the data while the remaining parameters are estimated very close to their prior values.
This may result from a change in the monetary policy regime, which until approximately
2002 was oriented on disinﬂation- rather that inﬂation targeting. As expected the correlation
coeﬃcients between euro area shocks are correlated with mean values ranging from .29 to
.84.
3.3 Impulse Response Functions
Figures 3 to 7 plot the impulse responses to various shocks together with 95% conﬁdence
intervals.
Figure 3 shows that following a positive monetary policy shock that leads to the increase
in the interest rate we observe a decline in the spreads on loans (due to the stickiness of the
interest rates) and a decline in loans both to households and ﬁrms. This results in a fall of
consumption and investment which leads to a decline in output and inﬂation.
Turning to Figure 4 we can see the adjustments that take place after a positive shock to
the spread on loans to households. This shock leads to an increase of the interest rate on loans
to households and, consequently, to a decline in loans to households which translates into
a fall in consumption. Eventually, GDP, inﬂation and interest rates fall. The expectations
of the fall in the interest rates lead the initial increase of investments. The increase of
investments initially outweights the eﬀect of the consumption decline (which declines slowly)
and GDP increases but after a while the decline in consumption brings GDP down. Inﬂation
initially goes up and then down. The interest rate falls after the initial increase.
Figure 5 shows the response of the economy to a positive shock to the spread on loans
to ﬁrms. It leads to a decline of loans to ﬁrms, and thus a drop in investment. There is
also a small increase in loans to households which results in a small increase in consumption,
but it is quantitatively not important since it is outweighted by the decline of investment.
Thus, GDP falls. The increasing spread on loans to ﬁrms raises the cost of borrowing
for producers and production costs which translates into an increase in inﬂation. Given
the opposite direction of GDP and inﬂation reaction, monetary policy reacts with only a
marginal tightening.
Figure 6 shows the impact of a positive shock to the LTV for households. First, it
increases loans to household and thus, consumption. There is also a quantitatively unim-
portant eﬀect on loans to ﬁrms and investment. Rising consumption leads to an increase in
GDP and inﬂation, which results in an increase in the interest rate.
Finally, we look at the response of the economy to a positive shock to the LTV for ﬁrms,
which is shown in Figure 7. First, loosening of the credit constraint results in an increase
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in loans to entrepreneurs. Since, the entrepreneurs know that the shock is temporary and
they would not be able to sustain higher investment in the long run they initially mostly
increase consumption and only slightly investment. Rising consumption and investment
lead to higher GDP and inﬂation, which in turn result in a monetary policy tightening and
reduces investment and consumption.
4 The crunch
As already noted in the introduction, there are reasons to suggest that shocks generated by
the Polish banking sector could have contributed to the slowdown of the Polish economy
during the ﬁnancial crisis. In this section we use the estimated model to assess how strong
this contribution was. As a ﬁrst step we take a closer look at the historical decomposition of
structural shocks. These have been collected in Figure 9. In our model there are ﬁve shocks
that can be ascribed to the banking sector, two to loan-to-value ratios (mH and mF ) and
three to spreads (zHD , z
H
L and z
F
L ). From eyeballing the Figure it becomes clear that during the
last observed quarters, shocks to loan-to-value ratios assumed historical minima (note that
the last observation on each graph is zero by construction, the last observed period (2q2009)
is the last but one point). This is equivalent to a strong tightening of lending constraints by
commercial banks. Regarding shocks to interest rate spreads, the evidence is less clear. We
can observe some tightening in the case of deposit rates and household loans during the last
few quarters, though these are not extreme compared to historical experience. It should be
however noted, that the sample includes a period (late 1990's) when the competition in the
Polish banking sector was relatively low, thus allowing for substantial swings in interest rate
spreads. The shock decomposition does not reveal any substantial tightening in the case of
spreads on enterprise loans. One more thing that is obvious from analysing the graphs are
also the extremely strong negative shocks detected in the euro area. These aﬀected all three
foreign variables, output (y∗), inﬂation (pi∗) and the interest rate (R∗). Not surprisingly, this
suggests that the slowdown of the Polish economy was also caused by foreign factors.
To gain more insight into the impact of ﬁnancial shocks on output we run a counterfactual
scenario. To do this the model is solved in autoregressive form:
Xt = AXt−1 +But (56)
where Xt is a vector of all endogenous variables, A and B are coeﬃcient matrices and ut is
a vector of structural shocks. Given initial values X0 and historical shocks (as presented in
Figure 9), this allows for obtaining historical time series of all endogenous variables. Our
counterfactual scenarios involve substituting zero values for selected shocks during the last
four periods of our sample (3q2008-2q2009). However, since the impact of most shocks takes
time to feed through to the economy (as can be observed from impulse response functions)
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and the scenario involves changing most recent shocks, we extend our impact analysis for
the consecutive 20 periods, running an unconditional forecast (assuming all shocks between
periods T +1 and T +20 to be zero). We perform four scenarios, whose results are presented
in Figures 10 - 13. The solid line shows the historical (model based smoothed estimate) time
series of output and its unconditional forecast. The dashed line presents the counterfactual
output series. The series deviate only from 3q2008, i.e. the point where shock histories start
to diﬀer. Finally, the dotted line shows the diﬀerence between the two previous lines which
can be interpreted as the pure impact of the analysed scenario on output. The vertical line
denotes the point where the historical data ends and the forecast begins.
Scenario 1 assumes the absence of shocks to interest rate spreads. It can be clearly seen
that the contribution of these shocks to the slowdown was marginal. Scenario 2 assumes
the absence of LTV shocks. These have a stronger contribution to the weakening of GDP.
Scenario 3 adds the impact of the above scenarios to see the total contribution of shocks
generated by the ﬁnancial sector to the slowdown of the real economy in Poland. Obviously
the impact is substantial though not overwhelming, banking sector shocks can explain ap-
proximately 1.3 percentage points of the decline in GDP. For comparison we also explore the
impact of foreign shocks which intuitively played a dominant role in driving the slowdown.
This hypothesis is conﬁrmed by scenario 4 (Figure 13) which assumes the absence of foreign
(output, inﬂation and interest rate) shocks during the period 3q2008-2q2009. Clearly these
shocks had a much stronger contribution to the performance of the Polish economy than do-
mestic banking sector shocks. According to our model the recession in the EU is responsible
for a decline in Polish GDP of approximately 2.6 percentage points.
Our results diﬀer from the ﬁnding in Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2009) who report
a dominating contribution of ﬁnancial sector developments on euro area output. However,
there are several arguments that help explain the diﬀerence. First, the role of banking
intermediation in the euro area is much higher than in Poland. For instance the ratio of
outstanding bank loans to GDP in 2008 was 116% in the euro area compared to 52% in
Poland. This makes the Polish economy less prone to a credit crunch. Second, Poland
is substantially more open to foreign trade than the euro area. For instance the ratio of
exports and imports of goods to GDP in 2008 was 34% in the euro area compared to 70%
in Poland. This makes Poland more prone to a fallout in external demand. Moreover,
Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2009) model a closed economy so the foreign channel is
closed by construction there. Third, the euro area banking sector was probably to a larger
extent aﬀected by the ﬁnancial crisis. While problems in Poland were mainly related to
liquidity shortages on interbank markets, in the euro area several banks made huge losses
on structurised assets which weakened their capital positions and lending abilities. This
suggests that the tightening of lending could have been stronger in the euro area.
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5 Conclusions
In this paper we construct a small open economy DSGE model with a banking sector. Both,
households and ﬁrms are allowed to borrow, but their borrowing abilities are restricted by
collateral requirements. The banking sector operates under monopolistic competition and is
by itself generator of various shocks. These consist of shocks to interest rate margins and
loan-to-value ratios. Our model is capable of generating signiﬁcant and relatively persistent
eﬀects of frictions generated by the banking sector.
The model is then estimated to Polish data in order to answer the question about the role
played by the banking sector in generating the slowdown during the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008-
09. Our ﬁndings show some role for ﬁnancial shocks. A counterfactual scenario, assuming no
shocks on the side of the banking sector in the period 3q2008-2q2009 shows that the Polish
banking sector contributed 1.3 percentage points to the decline in real GDP. Moreover we
ﬁnd that the bulk of impact was generated by quantitative (LTV) rather than price (interest
rate spread) shocks. Nevertheless this is still substantially less than the impact of foreign
shocks, which are found to account for the major part of the slowdown.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Selected calibrated parameters of the model
Parameter βP βI δk δχ µ µw η α
Value 0.995 0.975 0.025 0.0125 1 0.1 0.45 0.3
Table 2: Selected steady state values of the model
Parameter l¯
H
¯˜y
l¯F
¯˜y
m¯H m¯F c¯¯˜y
i¯
¯˜y
i¯χ
¯˜y
l¯
y¯
R¯ R¯HL R¯
F
L
Value 0.05 0.06 0.7 0.2 0.6 0.15 0.05 0.5 1.0125 1.025 1.017
Table 3: Prior and posterior distribution: structural parameters
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ξ beta 0.50 0.10 0.48 0.48 0.08
σχ norm 4.00 0.50 3.87 3.92 0.51
σc norm 2.00 0.50 2.34 2.39 0.41
σn norm 4.00 0.50 3.91 3.95 0.50
κk beta 0.10 0.05 0.31 0.32 0.05
κχ beta 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00
ψ gamm 0.20 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.05
θW beta 0.60 0.10 0.63 0.64 0.08
θH beta 0.60 0.10 0.87 0.87 0.02
θF beta 0.60 0.10 0.69 0.69 0.06
θD beta 0.60 0.10 0.54 0.55 0.06
θL beta 0.60 0.10 0.52 0.53 0.04
θ∗H beta 0.60 0.10 0.87 0.86 0.03
ζw beta 0.50 0.10 0.55 0.54 0.10
ζH beta 0.50 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.04
ζF beta 0.50 0.10 0.17 0.19 0.05
ζ∗H beta 0.50 0.10 0.50 0.51 0.11
φR beta 0.70 0.10 0.87 0.86 0.02
φpi norm 1.50 0.10 1.47 1.48 0.10
φy norm 0.50 0.05 0.52 0.51 0.05
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Table 4: Prior and posterior distribution: shocks
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ρu beta 0.70 0.10 0.81 0.80 0.06
ρχ beta 0.70 0.10 0.72 0.71 0.11
ρn beta 0.70 0.10 0.93 0.92 0.03
ρA beta 0.70 0.10 0.76 0.75 0.05
ρρ beta 0.70 0.10 0.53 0.53 0.09
ρg beta 0.30 0.10 0.38 0.39 0.05
ρmH beta 0.70 0.05 0.73 0.73 0.04
ρmF beta 0.70 0.05 0.74 0.74 0.04
ρzHD beta 0.70 0.10 0.61 0.60 0.09
ρzHL beta 0.70 0.10 0.67 0.66 0.09
ρzFL beta 0.70 0.10 0.48 0.48 0.09
ρpi∗ beta 0.70 0.10 0.51 0.52 0.10
ρy∗ beta 0.70 0.10 0.75 0.75 0.05
ρR∗ beta 0.70 0.10 0.89 0.88 0.03
σc invg 0.05 Inf 0.060 0.065 0.012
σχ invg 0.05 Inf 0.023 0.062 0.009
σn invg 0.20 Inf 0.421 0.571 0.209
σA invg 0.05 Inf 0.024 0.026 0.003
σρ invg 0.05 Inf 0.012 0.013 0.002
σR invg 0.01 Inf 0.002 0.002 0.000
σg invg 0.01 Inf 0.007 0.008 0.007
σmH invg 0.10 Inf 0.084 0.086 0.009
σmF invg 0.10 Inf 0.101 0.104 0.010
σzHD invg 0.01 Inf 0.004 0.005 0.001
σzHL invg 0.01 Inf 0.005 0.005 0.001
σzFL invg 0.01 Inf 0.004 0.004 0.001
σpi∗ invg 0.01 Inf 0.003 0.003 0.000
σy∗ invg 0.01 Inf 0.008 0.008 0.001
σR∗ invg 0.01 Inf 0.002 0.002 0.000
corrpi∗y∗ norm 0 0.5 0.39 0.33 0.16
corrpi∗R∗ norm 0 0.5 0.36 0.29 0.18
corrR∗y∗ norm 0 0.5 0.88 0.84 0.04
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Figure 1: Exports and GDP in Poland (y-o-y).
Source: Eurostat, NBP for 2009 forecast
Figure 2: New loans to households and entrepreneurs (PLN mn) and collateral requirements∗.LTV Wykres 4
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Note: collateral requirements based on Senior Loan Oﬃcer Survey. The LTV series refer to the share of oﬃcers who claim less restrictive collateral
requirements minus the share of those who claim more restrictive requirements, see NBP (2009b).
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Figure 3: Impulse response to a monetary policy shock
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Figure 4: Impulse response to a spread on household loans shock.
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Figure 5: Impulse response to a spread on loans to ﬁrms shock.
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Figure 6: Impulse response to a households LTV shock
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Figure 7: Impulse response to a ﬁrms LTV shock
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Figure 8: Impulse response to a foreign demand shock.
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Figure 9: Historical shocks.
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Figure 10: Scenario 1. GDP with and without interest rate spread shocks after 3q 2008 (obs.
47), percentage deviations form steady state.
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Note: vertical line denotes the end of sample and beginning of unconditional forecast.
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Figure 11: Scenario 2. GDP with and without LTV ratios shocks after 3q 2008 (obs. 47),
percentage deviations form steady state.
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Figure 12: Scenario 3. GDP with and without ﬁnancial sector shocks (LTV ratios and spread
shocks) after 3q 2008 (obs. 47), percentage deviations form steady state.
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Figure 13: Scenario 4. GDP with and without external shocks (foreign demand, int. rate
and inﬂation shocks) after 3q 2008 (obs. 47), percentage deviations form steady state.
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A The log-linearised model
The bar above a variable denotes the deterministic steady state of the variable, while a hat
denotes the log deviation from the the deterministic steady state i.e. xˆt = log xt − log x¯.
A.1 Households and entrepreneurs
Deﬁne marginal utilities for patient households, impatient households and entrepreneurs
uˆPc,t =
−σ
1− ξ
(
cˆPt − ξcˆPt−1
)
+ εˆt (A.1)
uˆIc,t =
−σ
1− ξ
(
cˆIt − ξcˆIt−1
)
+ εˆt (A.2)
uˆEc,t =
−σ
1− ξ
(
cˆEt − ξcˆEt−1
)
+ εˆt (A.3)
A.1.1 Patient households
From the patient households problem we obtain:
Euler equation
uˆPc,t = Et
[
uˆPc,t+1 + Rˆ
H
D,t − pˆit+1
]
(A.4)
Housing
σχχˆ
P
t = −uˆPc,t − pˆχ,t +
βP (1− δχ)
1− βP (1− δχ)Et
[
pˆiχ,t+1 − RˆHD,t
]
+ εˆχ,t (A.5)
A.1.2 Impatient households
Housing(
1− βI (1− δχ) +
(
βI − p¯i
R¯HL
)
m¯H
)(
εˆχ,t − σχχˆIt
)
= uˆc,t + pˆχ,t + m¯
HβI (Etuˆc,t+1)
+
(
βI − p¯i
R¯HL
)
m¯H
(
Etpˆχ,t+1 + mˆ
H
t
)− m¯H p¯i
R¯HL
(
Etpˆit+1 + uˆc,t − RˆHL,t
)
− (1− δχ) βI (Etuˆc,t+1 + Etpˆχ,t+1) (A.6)
Borrowing Constraint
RˆHL,t + lˆ
I
t = mˆ
H
t + Et [pˆχ,t+1 + pˆit+1] + χˆ
I
t (A.7)
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Flow of funds (Budget Constraint)
γI c¯I
¯˜y
cˆIt +
γI χ¯I
χ¯
i¯χ
¯˜y
(
pˆχ,t +
1
δχ
χˆIt −
1− δχ
δχ
χˆIt−1
)
+
R¯HL
p¯i
l¯H
¯˜y
(
RˆHL,t−1 + lˆ
H
t−1 − pˆit
)
=
γIw¯n¯
¯˜y
(
wˆt + nˆ
I
t
)
+
l¯H
¯˜y
lˆHt − γI
T¯
¯˜y
Tˆt (A.8)
A.1.3 Entrepreneurs
Labour demand
wˆt = pˆW,t + Aˆt + αuˆt + α
(
kˆt−1 − nˆt
)
(A.9)
Capital utilisation
uˆt = Ψ
−1
(
pˆW,t + Aˆt + (1− α)
(
nˆt − uˆt − kˆt−1
))
(A.10)
where Ψ = ψ
′′(1)
ψ′(1) .
Euler
pˆk,t = (1− δk) βIEt
[
pˆk,t+1 +
(
uˆEc,t+1 − uˆEc,t
)]
+ βIψ
′ (1)Et
[
uˆEc,t+1 − uˆEc,t + Ψuˆt+1
]
+ m¯F (1− δk) p¯i
(( 1
R¯FL
− βI
p¯i
)
Et
[
mˆFt + pˆk,t+1
]
− 1
R¯FL
Et
[
RˆFL,t − pˆit+1
]
− βI
p¯i
Et
[
uˆEc,t+1 − uˆEc,t
])
(A.11)
Borrowing Constraint
RˆFL,t + lˆ
F
t = mˆ
F
t + Et [pˆk,t+1] + Et [pˆit+1] + kˆt (A.12)
Production Function
yˆW,t = Aˆt + α
(
uˆt + kˆt−1
)
+ (1− α) nˆt (A.13)
Flow of funds
γE c¯E
c¯
c¯
¯˜y
cˆEt =
p¯W y¯W
¯˜y
(pˆW,t + yˆW,t) +
1− δk
δk
i¯
¯˜y
(
pˆk,t + kˆt−1
)
+
l¯F
¯˜y
lˆFt −
w¯n¯
¯GDP
(wˆt + nˆt)
− 1
δk
i¯
¯˜y
(
pˆk,t + kˆt
)
− ψ
′ (1)
δk
i¯
¯˜y
uˆt − R¯
F
L
p¯i
l¯F
¯˜y
(
RˆFL,t−1 + lˆ
F
t−1 − pˆit
)
− γE T¯¯˜y Tˆt (A.14)
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A.1.4 Labour supply
Wages
θw
1− θw (wˆt − wˆt−1 + pˆit − ζwpˆit−1) =
1− β¯θw
1 + σn
1+µw
µw
[
− ˆ¯Uc,t + σnnˆt + εˆn,t − wˆt
]
+
β¯θw
1− θwEt [wˆt+1 − wˆt + pˆit+1 − ζwpˆit] (A.15)
A.2 Producers
Denote pH,t =
PH,t
Pt
, pF,t =
PF,t
Pt
, pH,t =
P ∗H,t
P ∗t
,
A.2.1 Capital Good Producers
Price of capital
iˆt =
κk
1 + β
pˆk,t +
β
1 + β
Etiˆt+1 +
1
1 + β
iˆt−1 (A.16)
Capital accumulation
kˆt = (1− δk) kˆt−1 + δk iˆk,t (A.17)
A.2.2 Housing Producers
Price of housing
iˆχ,t =
κχ
1 + βP
pˆk,t +
βP
1 + βP
Etiˆχ,t+1 +
1
1 + βP
iˆχ,t−1 (A.18)
Housing accumulation
χˆt = (1− δχ) χˆt−1 + δχχˆt (A.19)
A.2.3 Final Good Producers
Production function
yˆt = η
µ
1+µ
(
y¯H
y¯
) 1
1+µ
yˆH,t + (1− η)
µ
1+µ
(
y¯F
y¯
) 1
1+µ
yˆF,t (A.20)
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Demand for domestic and imported intermediate goods.
yˆH,t = −1 + µ
µ
(pˆH,t) + yˆt (A.21)
yˆF,t = −1 + µ
µ
(pˆF,t) + yˆt (A.22)
Inﬂation.
pˆit = (1− η) (p¯F )
−1
µ (pˆiF,t + pˆF,t−1) + η (p¯H)
−1
µ (pˆiH,t + pˆH,t−1) (A.23)
A.2.4 Domestic Retailers
Domestic goods inﬂation
pˆiH,t = pˆit + pˆH,t − pˆH,t−1 (A.24)
Domestic goods prices
θH
1− θH (pˆH,t + pˆit − pˆH,t−1 − ζH pˆit−1) = (1− βP θH) (pˆW,t − pˆH,t)
+
βP θH
1− θHEt [pˆH,t+1 − pˆH,t + pˆit+1 − ζH pˆit] (A.25)
A.2.5 Importing Retailers
Imported goods inﬂation
pˆiF,t = pˆit + pˆF,t − pˆF,t−1 (A.26)
Imported goods prices
θF
1− θF (pˆF,t + pˆit − pˆF,t−1 − ζF pˆit−1) = (1− βP θF ) (qˆt − pˆF,t)
+
βP θF
1− θF Et [pˆF,t+1 − pˆF,t + pˆit+1 − ζF pˆit] (A.27)
A.2.6 Exporting Retailers
Demand for exported intermediate goods
yˆ∗H,t = −
1 + µ∗H
µ∗H
(
pˆ∗H,t
)
+ yˆ∗t (A.28)
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Exported goods inﬂation
pˆi∗H,t = pˆ
∗
H,t + pˆi
∗
t − pˆ∗H,t−1 (A.29)
Exported goods prices
θ∗H
1− θ∗H
(
pˆ∗H,t + pˆi
∗
t − pˆ∗H,t−1 − ζ∗H pˆi∗t−1
)
= (1− βP θ∗H)
(
pˆW,t − qˆt − pˆ∗H,t
)
+
βP θ
∗
H
1− θ∗H
Et
[
pˆ∗H,t+1 − pˆ∗H,t + pˆi∗t+1 − ζ∗H pˆi∗t
]
(A.30)
A.3 Banking
A.3.1 Financial intermediaries
No equations after loglinearisation.
A.3.2 Saving bank
Interest rates
θD
1− θD
(
RˆHD,t − RˆHD,t−1
)
=
βP θD
1− θDEt
[
RˆHD,t+1 − RˆHD,t
]
+ (1− βP θD)
(
Rˆt + zˆ
H
D,t − RˆHD,t
)
(A.31)
A.3.3 Lending bank
Interest rates for households
θL
1− θL
(
RˆHL,t − RˆHL,t−1
)
=
βP θL
1− θLEt
[
RˆHL,t+1 − RˆHL,t
]
+ (1− βP θL)
(
Rˆt − zˆHL,t − RˆHL,t
)
(A.32)
Interest rates for ﬁrms
θL
1− θL
(
RˆFL,t − RˆFL,t−1
)
=
βP θL
1− θLEt
[
RˆFL,t+1 − RˆFL,t
]
+ (1− βP θL)
(
Rˆt − zˆFL,t − RˆFL,t
)
(A.33)
Uncovered interest parity (UIP)
Rˆt − Rˆ∗t =Et
[
(qˆt+1 − qˆt) +
(
pˆit+1 − pˆi∗t+1
)]
+ ρˆt (A.34)
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Risk premium. From (46) we obtain
ρˆt = %
l¯
¯˜y
(
lˆ∗t − ˆ˜yt
)
+ εκ,t (A.35)
A.4 Government
Government expenditures. From (48) we obtain
Gˆt = (1− ρg) Gˆt−1 + εˆg,t (A.36)
Government budget. From (47) we obtain
Gˆt = Tˆt (A.37)
A.5 Central Bank
Taylor rule. From (49) we obtain
Rˆt = γRRˆt−1 + (1− γR)
(
γpipˆit + γy ˆ˜yt
)
+ ϕt (A.38)
A.6 Market clearing, Balance of Payments and GDP
Denote l∗t =
etL∗t
Pt
and qt =
EtP ∗t
pt
.
Final goods. From (50) we obtain
c¯
¯˜y
cˆt +
i¯k
¯˜y
ıˆk,t +
i¯χ
¯˜y
ıˆχ,t +
g¯
¯˜y
gˆt +
ψ′ (1)
δk
i¯
¯˜y
uˆt =
y¯
¯˜y
yˆt (A.39)
and from (51) we obtain
γI
c¯I
c¯
cˆIt + γ
P c¯
P
c¯
cˆPt + γ
E c¯
E
c¯
cˆEt = cˆt (A.40)
Intermediate homogeneous goods. From (52) we obtain
y¯H
y¯H + y¯∗H
yˆH,t +
y¯∗H
y¯H + y¯∗H
yˆ∗H,t = yˆW,t (A.41)
Housing. From (53) we obtain
γP
χ¯P
χ¯
χˆPt + γ
I χ¯
I
χ¯
χˆIt = χˆt−1 (A.42)
44
Balance of Payments. From (54) we obtain
(1 + τF )
p¯F y¯F
¯˜y
(pˆF,t + yˆF,t) +
l¯∗
¯˜y
R¯∗ρ¯
p¯i∗
(
qˆt − qˆt−1 − pˆi∗t + lˆ∗t−1 + Rˆ∗t−1 + ρˆt−1
)
=
= (1 + τ ∗H)
q¯p¯∗H y¯
∗
H
¯˜y
(
qˆt + pˆ
∗
H,t + yˆ
∗
H,t
)
+
l¯∗
¯˜y
· lˆ∗t (A.43)
GDP. From (55) we obtain
ˆ˜yt =
y¯
¯˜y
yˆt +
q¯p¯∗H y¯
∗
H
¯˜y
(pˆ∗H + yˆ
∗
H + qˆt)−
p¯F y¯F
¯˜y
(pˆF + yˆF ) (A.44)
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